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Abstract
In this article we characterize, for the period 1985 to 2000, the evolution of
inequality in hourly wages, hours of work, labor earnings, household income and
household consumption for Spain. We look at both the Encuesta Continua de Pre-
supuestos Familiares and the European Household Community Panel. Our analysis
shows that over the period 1985-2000 inequality in individual labor earnings and
household income has decreased substantially. The decreases in the tertiary educa-
tion premium and in the unemployment rate have been key ingredients to under-
stand this falling trend. However, the inequality reduction has not been monotonic:
after a sharp fall of inequality during the economic expansion between the mid eight-
ies and the early nineties, inequality increased during the recession of 1993. Then,
in the mid nineties it started to fall again. In contrast, the observed reduction in
inequality in consumption has been much smaller than in any measure of income,
and it has been concentrated in the second half of the eighties. This suggests that
the reduction in income inequality has aected the sources of permanent dierences
between individuals and households only during the second half of the 80's. Our
estimates of the earnings process for the period are consistent with this view.
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11 Introduction
In recent years macroeconomists have extended their focus from the traditional analysis
of long run trends and cycles in aggregate variables to the analysis of long run trends
and cycles in distributions.1 In this article we use household level surveys to characterize
the evolution over time of inequality in labor earnings, hourly wages, hours of work and
consumption for Spain. Our main choices of variable denitions and sample selection are
taken such that the results can be compared to the results of other countries documented
in this same issue. We complement our analysis with a characterization of the evolution of
the dispersion of these same variables over the life cycle. As Deaton and Paxson (1994) and
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) show, inequality of labor earnings, consumption
and hours of work over the life cycle can reveal important information on both the amount
of uncertainty in the labor market and the available nancial technology to smooth out
consumption uctuations. Finally, we also provide estimates for the stochastic processes
driving the shocks in the labor market in order to decompose the evolution of uncertainty
into permanent and transitory shocks.
The analysis of trends in inequality for Spain faces the problem of a lack of long-
lasting household surveys prior to the mid 80's. The longest running household survey
is the Labor Force Survey, which started in 1976. Unfortunately it does not collect any
data on labor earnings or wages. For our analysis we will combine two dierent data sets:
the continuous household expenditure survey (called Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos
Familiares), which was run between 1985 to 1996 and the European Household Panel,
which ranges from 1994 to 2001. However, each survey lacks some important data. The
consumption survey does not report data on hours worked, while the European panel does
not report data on consumption. Neither of them reports data on wealth. This implies
that it is not possible to characterize the joint evolution of consumption and hours worked,
and that it is not possible to describe the evolution of the wealth distribution.2
Our period of study hence ranges from 1985 to 2000. This is a long period of economic
expansion in Spain, with the average rate of growth of per capita gdp equal to 3.3 percent.
As it is shown in panel (a) of Figure 1, there was only a brief recession in the years 1992
and 1993, with the latter year being the only one with negative growth. In spite of this
healthy growth, the unemployment rate was high (see panel (b) in Figure 1). In 1985
the unemployment rate was 21 percent. This was the maximum after the hike started in
the mid 70's. Then it declined steadily to 16 percent in 1991. However, the downturn of
1992 and 1993 generated a big surge in unemployment, which skyrocketed to 24 percent
in 1994. In the remaining years of our sample period the unemployment rate fell steadily
1For instance, two recent articles that analyze the trends in income and consumption inequality in the
US are Krueger and Perri (2006) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008b).
2Regarding the distribution of wealth, the Bank of Spain has recently started the Encuesta Financiera
de las Familias, a survey of consumer nances modeled after its American counterpart. It is a tri-annual
cross-section (with an important panel component) that includes data on household income, labor supply
and consumption, as well as very detailed data on assets and liabilities. The waves for 2002 and 2005
are already available. See Bover (2008) for a rst descriptive analysis of the wealth distribution in Spain
using the Encuesta Financiera de las Familias.
2Figure 1: A brief macro outlook
  -2
   0
   2
   4
   6
03 01 99 97 95 93 91 89 87 85 83 81
(a) growth of gdp per capita
   5
  10
  15
  20
  25
  30
03 01 99 97 95 93 91 89 87 85 83 81
(b) Unemployment rate
   5
  10
  15
  20
  25
03 01 99 97 95 93 91 89 87 85 83 81
(c) Share college workers
  10
  20
  30
  40
  50
03 01 99 97 95 93 91 89 87 85 83 81
(d) Employment rate females
Note: Data in panels (b), (c) and (d) refer to individuals aged 16 and older. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadstica
up to 10.5 percent in the year 2000.3 During our sample period there were two important
demographic changes happening in the labor market. First, there was an educational
transition. The share of employed workers with a college degree increased from 10 percent
in 1985 to 18.5 percent in 2000 (see panel (c) of Figure 1). Second, there was a massive
entrance of young females in the labor force. The employment rate of females increased
from 21.4 percent in 1985 to 33 percent in 2000 (see panel (d) of Figure 1).
Our analysis of the evolution in cross-sectional inequality shows that during the whole
period 1985-2000 inequality in individual labor earnings in Spain has decreased substan-
tially, with the drop in the college premium being the main observable factor behind this
fall. In addition, the hefty increase in the incomes at the lower tail of the distribution
reveals the crucial role played by the reduction of unemployment along the period. In-
equality in household disposable income has followed the same trend, but with a smaller
drop and milder uctuations. We nd that public transfers (among them unemployment
benets and retirement and disability pensions) have played a major role in smoothing
out the inequality arising in the labor market. Instead, the Spanish family does not
seem to have been an important insurance mechanism. Inequality of labor earnings at
3An important number of labor market policies reforms were passed over the period of analysis, all of
them with the aim of making Spanish labor market more exible. See Section 2 for details.
3the household level is larger than at the individual level, and private transfers between
households have a very minor impact in inequality reduction. Regarding household con-
sumption, inequality has fallen less than inequality in household disposable income, with
the decrease mostly concentrated in the second half of the eighties.
Looking within sub-periods, we nd that the economic expansion between 1985 and
1992 brought a clear reduction of inequality between households. Inequality in labor
earnings of workers fell and so did the inequality of disposable income at the household
level, albeit to a lesser degree. The fall in inequality in labor market earnings was partly
due to the fall in the college premium: the dierence in the average annual earnings of
workers with a college degree and the rest of workers shrank 40 percentage points during
the period. The simultaneous increase in the experience premium attenuated the eect
on inequality. This is the only period in which the fall of inequality seems to have aected
permanent sources of heterogeneity: consumption inequality fell and our estimated process
for labor earnings shows a decrease in the dispersion of the permanent component. Then,
the recession of 1992 and 1993 witnessed increases in inequality for all variables, mainly
as a result of the increase in unemployment. Finally, the recovery that ranges from the
mid 90's to the end of our sample period in the year 2000 generated a further reduction
of inequality, mainly at the lower tail of the earnings distribution. Again, the reduction
in the tertiary education premium is the main observable factor behind this fall.
When we look at the evolution of inequality over the life cycle we nd increases in
inequality of individual wages and household earnings, and also a smaller increase in
inequality of household disposable income and consumption. The increases in earnings
and consumption inequality seem to be stronger after the mid 40's. If we take the view that
the increase in earnings dispersion over the life cycle comes from the existence of persistent
shocks to earnings (as suggested by MaCurdy (1982)), then we have to conclude that
shocks to labor market earnings become either more volatile or more persistent during
the second half of the life-cycle. This would be consistent with the longer duration of
unemployment spells for older workers. In addition, these shocks are partly insurable:
consumption inequality increases over the life-cycle but less than earnings inequality. A
second interpretation for the growth of labor earnings inequality along the life cycle is
the existence of pre-determined dierences in the rate of growth of earnings (as suggested
by Lillard and Willis (1979)). Since consumption inequality increases over the life-cycle,
this second interpretation requires either the existence of strong borrowing constraints, or
alternatively the assumption that workers do not know their own type and learn about it
as new income shocks unfold (see Guvenen (2007) for a detailed argument).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the main
institutional changes in Spain for the period 1985 to 2000. In Section 3 we describe the
data sets and compare some statistics for the years in which they overlap. Then, in
Section 4 we describe the evolution of cross-sectional inequality, from the individual labor
market experience to the household disposable income and consumption. The estimates
of stochastic processes for hourly wages and household labor earnings are done in Section
5. In Section 6 we describe the evolution of inequality over the life cycle. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
42 Institutional changes
The 80's in Spain was a time of institutional and economic transition. In 1977 there were
the rst democratic elections after more than 35 years of dictatorship. The years between
1977 and 1982 served to set up the new rules of the game, but the economic reforms
extended through the whole decade. There was a process of industrial transformation and
there was an increase in the openness of the economy with the entrance in the European
Community in 1986. Along the period of our analysis there were several important reforms
in labor market regulation and personal income taxation. In the next paragraphs we try
to provide a quick overview of such reforms.
Concerning the labor market, the high unemployment rate that characterized the
Spanish economy induced several legislation changes. First, the 1984 Labor Law Reform
relaxed the conditions for rms to hire workers under xed term contracts. It is believed
that this Law encouraged the creation of new jobs and helped to reduce unemployment
for two reasons: it allowed rms to avoid the high severance payment associated to per-
manent contracts, and it helped to moderate wage growth as the wage gap between xed
term contracts and permanent contracts is substantial. However, it is also believed that
it contributed to an increase in the inequality of earnings across workers, the so called
"duality" of the labor market: workers in xed term contracts experience more unem-
ployment spells than heavily protected workers under permanent contracts. Second, in
1992 a set of measures were implemented to reduce the unemployment benets and to
toughen the eligibility conditions for it. This reform increased the incentives to search
for jobs and possibly helped to reduce unemployment, but it also lowered the incomes of
some unemployed workers. Third, in 1994 a new Labor Law Reform was passed. This new
reform targeted the wage growth of workers with permanent contracts. Several changes in
the workers-rms collective bargaining were introduced with two objectives. The rst one
was to strengthen the correlation between workers/rms performance and wage growth,
and the second one was to allow for more exibility in the allocation of working hours
along the year. Finally, the 1997 Labor Law Reform introduced a new type of permanent
contract with a lower severance payment aimed at increasing the fraction of permanent
contracts among workers and hence ght the duality of the labor market. To sum up, these
policies extended the use of temporary contracts, made collective bargaining more exible
and introduced reductions in the ring costs of permanent contracts. These reforms are
believed to have fostered the reduction in the unemployment rate that we observe during
the nineties
Regarding taxation, there were three important changes in the personal income tax
code during the period of analysis: in 1987, in 1994 and in 1998. In general, these changes
consisted of reductions in the top marginal tax rates, reductions in the numbers of income
brackets and the elimination of several types of deductions. One important change in 1987
was that joint taxation for married couples was considered optional instead of compulsory.
This was a tax reduction for dual earner couples, and hence a change that pointed to an
increase in inequality of after tax household income. However, the nal outcome of these
reforms in terms of progressivity is unclear.
53 Data Sets
As discussed in the introduction, we use two dierent household surveys to span the
period 1985 to 2000. First, the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF).
This is the old expenditure survey in Spain, ranging from 1985 to 1996. It is a panel
that follows 3,600 households for up to 8 consecutive quarters (two full years). It collects
very detailed data for consumption at the household level and income data in dierent
categories per household member. However, there is no data for hours nor wealth. This
data set allows us to track the evolution of the dispersion in household labor earnings,
household disposable income and household consumption (including their covariances),
as well as the life-cycle proles of mean, variance and covariance of these same variables.
It is also possible to estimate a process of household labor earnings and decompose the
evolution of labor earnings dispersion between returns to observable variables and residual
inequality. At the individual level, however, it is of limited interest. Education, which is a
key determinant of earnings, is only available for the head, whereas labor market status is
only available for both the head and the spouse. Hence, our sample of individual level data
will focus on heads only. This survey was stopped in 1996 and its current replacement
presents a very important problem for our study: income is aggregated at the household
level and comes in very wide brackets for around 80 percent of the households.
The second data set is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). This is
a European-wide household panel where households are followed for several years. The
survey ranges from 1994 to 2001, but since income variables refer to the year before the
survey was conducted, it allows us to document the period 1993 to 2000. It is particularly
appropriated for this project because the survey design is the same for the EU-12 countries
plus some later additions (the list of countries includes Italy, Germany, UK and Sweden).
It has good data for labor earnings, disposable income and hours of work per household
member. Therefore, it allows a good analysis at the individual level as well as at the
household level. On the minus side, there is neither data for wealth nor consumption.
We can build time series for the dispersion of labor earnings, disposable income, hours
and hourly wages both at the household and individual level and life-cycle proles of
mean, variance and covariance of these same variables. Furthermore, we can estimate a
process for both labor earnings and hourly wages and decompose the evolution of labor
income and hourly wages dispersion between returns to observable variables and residual
inequality.
3.1 Sample Selection
Throughout our analysis we will use three dierent samples.
Sample 1 is a sample of households. In both data sets we take all households with
a head between 25 and 60 years of age. We dene as head the household member with
the highest regular income of the household (over the period in which the household is
observed), regardless of age or gender. The reason for making this choice is that this is
the criterion followed in the ECPF, a data set that only reports education level for the
6household head and labor market status for the head and spouse. In order to preserve
comparability between data sets and to keep the information on education and labor
market status, we extend the head denition of the ECPF to the ECHP.4 We will use
sample 1 to analyze how earnings originated in the labor market combine with other
sources of income at the household level to obtain the evolution of inequality in total
disposable income and the evolution of inequality in household consumption.
Sample 2 is a sample of household heads active in the labor market. We just take
the sample of households and keep the income data for the household head if the labor
market status of the head is currently working or unemployed. We will use this sample
to analyze inequality in the labor market at the individual level. Of course, one has to be
aware that a sample of household heads is dierent from a sample of individuals: there
is a higher fraction of men, average age is higher and there is a lower fraction of college
educated workers.5
Sample 3 is a sample of individuals aged 25 to 60 who participate in the labor market,
supply a positive number of hours and have non-zero labor earnings. We use this sample
to analyze inequality in hourly wages and labor supply. Since we do not have data for
hours in the ECPF, we construct this sample only for the ECHP.
One particularity for samples 2 and 3 in the ECHP is that to construct hourly wages
we do not use annual labor earnings in the previous year but monthly earnings in the
month before the interview takes place. The reason for this is that the ECHP only
reports information for hours as the usual weekly hours in the previous month. This
choice ensures a much less noisy measure of hourly wages and avoids creating a too large
division bias for the correlation of hours and wages. However, it is not without problems.
First, the time scope of the income denition used to construct annual earnings in samples
1 and 2 is dierent from the one used to construct hourly wages (monthly earnings). And
second, the monthly earnings refer only to labor earnings obtained as an employee, which
excludes any income from self-employment.6
As nal comments regarding the sample selection, in our data sets there is no top-
coding, so we observe the upper tail of the income distribution with detail. The ECPF
only reports data after taxes and the data quality in the ECHP for after tax earnings is
much higher than for before tax earnings. For this reason we use after tax data in all
our study.7 All incomes and consumption are deated with the Consumer Price Index
and reported in 1995 euros. In Appendix A we dene the variables used throughout the
analysis.
4Our denition of household head diers from the more standard use of the highest earning male.
This is not critical for our analysis. See Appendix B.1 for a comparison of inequality in labor earnings
for dierent denitions of household head.
5See Section 3.3 for a comparison of demographics between our sample of heads and the Labor Force
Survey.
6See Appendix B.2 for a comparison between inequality of annual earnings and monthly earnings.
7In Appendix B.2 we compare the before tax and after tax measures of income in the ECHP.
73.2 Demographics: comparison of data sets
In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics for the sample of households in the two
data sets. As shown in the rst 6 rows, the average of demographic variables such as age,
marital status or household size in the overlapping years is remarkably similar. There
is just a slight discrepancy in the fraction of household heads that are male: around 85
percent in the ECPF and around 82 percent in the ECHP.
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
ECPF ECHP
85-87 88-90 91-93 94-96 94-96 97-99 00-01
Demographics
Fraction of Male Heads (%) 90.1 88.4 87.1 84.9 81.7 83.2 82.8
Age of Head 44.2 44.2 44.1 44.0 43.7 44.0 44.4
Fraction of Married Head (%) 87.6 86.2 85.0 83.9 83.5 84.1 82.0
Age of Spouse 41.2 41.3 41.3 41.4 41.4 42.1 42.8
Number of Adults 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8
Number of Children aged  16 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Education Head
Tertiary Education (%) 9.1 9.8 11.9 12.6 22.2 24.5 26.7
Upper Secondary Education (%) 9.2 11.7 15.2 17.5 14.9 16.8 17.1
Other (%) 81.7 78.5 73.0 69.9 62.9 58.7 56.1
Labor supply
Fraction of Head Employed (%)
All 81.0 84.7 83.1 81.3 80.4 84.9 86.9
Tertiary Education 95.2 96.3 94.7 94.0 93.1 95.6 94.2
Upper Secondary Education 94.0 93.8 91.9 90.4 85.0 89.1 92.4
Other 78.4 81.4 79.2 76.3 74.7 79.3 81.7
Fraction of Spouse Employed (%) 21.7 26.8 29.2 33.5 31.3 35.3 40.0
Fraction of both Employed (%) 18.3 23.9 25.5 28.6 23.6 27.8 31.2
Number of Observations 9,987 9,597 9,194 9,050 12,095 9,429 5,504
Note. The statistics are computed on our samples of households (sample 1), see Section 3.1.
The next 3 lines in Table 1 show data on education. We nd here an important
discrepancy between the two data sets. The share of heads with tertiary education in the
overlapping years is 12.6 percent in the ECPF whereas it is 22.2 percent in the ECHP.8
8This dierence is not due to the slightly dierent gender composition of heads in the two samples
because the dierence is preserved when we look only at household heads who are males.
8The gures in the Labor Force Survey, a much larger sample that covers all workers, are
closer to those in the ECPF.9 We think that this discrepancy is due to an over-sampling
of highly educated households in the ECHP rather than a problem with the denition of
the education categories themselves. We discuss this aspect in Section 3.4.
The bottom part of Table 1 shows data on employment. The two data sets are quite
consistent. The employment rates of heads and spouses are almost identical, and so
is the fraction of households with both members employed. When we break down the
employment rate of the heads by education group, we see that the employment rates
are also very similar across data sets. The only remarkable dierence is the employment
rate of heads with upper secondary education, which is 5 percentage points higher in the
ECPF than in the ECHP.
The statistics in Table 1 are consistent with the two important trends in the labor
market that we have documented in the introduction using data from the Labor Force
Survey. First, there is an educational transition: the share of household heads with
either college education or upper secondary education grows considerably over the sample
period. Second, there is a massive increase of secondary earners into the labor market:
the employment rate of spouses goes from around 20 percent in the mid 80's to more
than 40 percent in the year 2001. This is translated into a big increase in the share of
households where both head and spouse are employed.
3.3 Demographics: comparison to aggregate data
In order to analyze the representativeness of our samples, we start by comparing the
proportion of dierent demographic groups in the labor force with the equivalent gures
obtained from the Labor Force Survey (LFS). In panel (a) of Figure 2 we plot the fraction
of individuals with tertiary education. The gure in the LFS grows steadily between 10
and 20 percent. Our sample of household heads in the ECPF follows the trend very well,
with a slightly lower level. Instead, the sample of heads with tertiary education in the
ECHP is substantially larger than in the LFS. Furthermore, the sample of individuals
(sample 3) in the ECHP shows a larger proportion of people with tertiary education than
found both in the sample of heads of this same data set and in the LFS. We conclude
that the sample of heads is relatively less educated than the Spanish population (possibly
due to the dierence in age, see below) and that the ECHP over-samples highly educated
individuals (sample 3 in the ECHP should be representative of the population and hence
close to the LFS). Regarding the proportion of females, panel (b) shows that our samples of
heads under represent the actual number of females in the Spanish labor force. Instead,
the sample of individuals in the ECHP aggregates very well to the actual number of
females. Finally, regarding age, we nd that the samples of heads are relatively older
than the Spanish labor force (see panels c and d).
9See Section 3.3 for details.
9Figure 2: Participants by type of person
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3.4 Income distribution: comparison of data sets
In Table 2 we use sample 2 to compare several statistics of the distribution of household
head's annual labor earnings for the years in which our data sets overlap. Because the
ECHP collects income data for the year before the interview, the overlap for income
variables is for the period 1993-1996. Looking at the unconditional distribution, we see
that for every year the median labor earnings is similar across data sets, being slightly
larger in the ECPF (between 1 and 5 percent larger, depending on the year). However,
the dispersion is substantially larger in the ECHP: the standard deviation of the log of
income ranges from 0.69 to 0.66 in the ECPF and from 0.92 to 0.85 in the ECHP.10
When comparing the income at the tails of the distribution we observe that the higher
dispersion in the ECHP comes mainly from the very low incomes reported in the lower
tail. This dierence in income inequality is preserved across education groups: for our
three education groups we have that the median incomes and the incomes at the 90th
percentiles are very similar across data sets, with the big dierence being in the incomes
reported at the lower tail of the distribution.11
10The dierent level of dispersion in income variables between these two data sets has already been
reported elsewhere. See for instance Ayala and Sastre (2007).
11The low incomes at the lower tail of the ECHP seem to be associated to earnings of self-employed
workers.
10The dierence in inequality between the data sets is a concern, as it is the higher pro-
portion of heads with tertiary education in the ECHP. We think that these two problems
are unrelated and that the dierences in education arise from dierences in the sampling
design of the surveys rather than from misclassication of educational groups. We have
two reasons for this. First, the median income and the incomes at the 90th percentiles
within education groups are very similar across data sets. The higher inequality in the
ECHP comes from very low incomes at the lower tail for all three educational groups.
And second, the dierences across data sets in the coecients of labor earnings regres-
sions against observable variables are relatively small.12 Therefore, although there are
dierences in inequality levels across data sets, we think that the trends are comparable.
3.5 Average income and consumption: comparison to aggregate data
The ECPF is a survey designed to measure the structure of consumption spending of
Spanish households. It collects data for 215 dierent types of goods, mixing diary data
with two dierent levels of retrospective data. This eort pays o in terms of a good
aggregation of the survey data when compared to aggregate measures of consumption in
the Spanish National Accounts (SNA). Pou and Alegre (2002) provide a very detailed
comparison between the survey and the SNA. They show that non durable consumption
and services of the survey sum up to around 80 percent of the equivalent measure in the
National Accounts.13 Regarding durable consumption, Pou and Alegre (2002) report a
lower level of representativeness: the survey data sums up to between 60 and 80 percent,
depending on the years. Things are not so good for income data. According to Pou
and Alegre (2002), total household income net of taxes aggregates up to 60 percent of
the National Accounts. However, there is a lot of heterogeneity depending on the type
of income. For instance, they show that labor earnings is around 70 percent of the
aggregate gure but instead capital income is only around 15 percent. Finally, during the
twelve years of the sample there is no apparent loss of representativeness as the ratios
between aggregates from the survey and the aggregates from the SNA uctuate over the
years without any clear trend. Additionally, the survey does reasonably well in terms of
changes.
Regarding the comparison between the aggregates resulting from the ECHP and those
reported by the SNA, Delgado and Mercader-Prats (2001) do an accurate study for 1994.
They nd that the ECHP accounts for 91.4% of the net (after tax) wage and salary
12Against this argument there is the small dierence in employment rate for households with secondary
education. Given that in the ECPF the fraction of heads with tertiary education is lower than in the
ECHP, one could argue that some heads in the ECPF that report secondary education are misclassied
heads with tertiary education. If that was the case, the employment rate of heads with secondary
education in the ECPF should be higher than in the ECHP as the employment rate of misclassied heads
with tertiary education is higher. This is actually the case. Recall, however, that the dierence is not
too big and that the comparison with the Labor Force Survey shows that it is the ECHP and not the
ECPF the one that seems misaligned.
13This gure is good. We have to bear in mind that the SNA collect data of consumption at the national
level (this includes non-residents) whereas the ECPF considers only resident households. Consumption
of non-residents in the sample period is around 6.5 percent.
11Table 2: Annual labor earnings of head
ECPF ECHP
year Obs p10 p50 p90 sd Obs p10 p50 p90 sd
All
1993 2,006 2487 10,165 18,320 0.69 3,987 320 9,708 19,965 0.92
1994 2,063 2080 9,811 17,910 0.68 3,514 626 9,578 19,658 0.86
1995 1,994 2580 9,723 17,479 0.65 3,345 1,081 9,615 19,532 0.81
1996 2,026 2600 9,774 17,813 0.66 3,034 402 9,252 19,830 0.85
Tertiary Education
1993 246 8,263 16,436 27,206 0.48 907 6,340 15,718 27,739 0.71
1994 254 7,294 16,447 26,246 0.54 801 6,536 15,297 26,857 0.65
1995 246 7,769 16,238 25,875 0.53 794 6,478 15,578 27,766 0.63
1996 248 7,464 16,946 27,679 0.55 737 5,807 15,187 27,155 0.64
Secondary Education
1993 385 4,958 12,208 20,029 0.50 583 1,849 11,325 20,870 0.76
1994 378 4,342 12,085 20,075 0.53 554 1,813 10,655 20,659 0.81
1995 333 5,669 11,769 19,347 0.42 556 1,803 10,464 20,133 0.70
1996 404 4,836 11,820 18,582 0.57 520 1,685 10,075 20,226 0.83
Less than Secondary Education
1993 1,375 1,746 8,527 14,322 0.68 2,497 106 8,060 14,529 0.94
1994 1,431 1,272 8,418 14,017 0.66 2,159 110 7,948 14,274 0.85
1995 1,415 1,885 8,596 13,830 0.64 1,995 125 7,957 14,424 0.82
1996 1,374 1,963 8,603 14,185 0.64 1,777 0 7,743 13,869 0.84
Note. All earnings in 1995 euros. The statistics are computed on our samples of household heads (sample 2), see Section 3.1. We have
four overlapping years because the income data in the ECHP refers to the previous year. Obs refers to the number of observations;
p10, p50 and p90 refer to income at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles; sd referes to the standard deviation of the log.
earnings registered in the SNA, but only accounts for 49.0% of the gross (before tax)
wage and salary earnings. These values go up to 94.8% and 86.0% after imputations.
Concerning self-employed income, the ECHP only accounts for around 34% of the SNA
gure. Finally, the ECHP accounts for 39.3% of capital income, although the gure grows
up to 64.4% after imputations (household receiving capital income are under-represented
in the ECHP). There are some factors that can account for these discrepancies. First, the
ECHP does not include compensation in kind. Second, the National Accounts include
subjects not covered by the survey (as households living in the autonomous cities of
Ceuta and Melilla or non-prot organizations). Third, and possibly more important,
the frequency of missing values in the ECHP for the variable gross earnings is much
higher than for the variable net earnings (44.33% versus 2.65% of all workers in 1994).
This problem is solved by imputing earnings to these households, but it may aect the
comparison of the survey with the national accounts.
124 Cross Section Analysis
We start our analysis of inequality by looking at the evolution of cross-sectional dispersion
over time. In Section 4.1 we describe the evolution of inequality in the individual labor
market experience, focusing on hourly wages and labor supply. In Section 4.2 we look at
inequality in annual labor earnings for household heads. In Section 4.3 we make a deeper
look at the evolution of the tertiary education premium. In Section 4.4 we aggregate
individuals over the household and look at broader denitions of income. Finally, in
Section 4.5 we look at inequality in consumption.
4.1 Inequality in hourly wages and labor supply
Our primitive measure of labor market outcome at the individual level is the hourly wage.
As there is no available data for hours in the ECPF, we can not report the evolution of
the distribution of hourly wages back to 1985. We can only build series for the period
1994 to 2001 by use of the ECHP. Since the ECHP reports education attainment for all
individuals, we will use the more comprehensive sample 3 throughout this section.
During our period of study the labor market in Spain was characterized by a very
large incidence of unemployment. In our sample of individuals this is reected into a
large fraction of zeros in monthly labor earnings for people who declare to be either
currently working as an employee or currently unemployed.14 In Figure 3 we show the
evolution of the fraction of individuals reporting zero monthly labor earnings. We observe
that this fraction grows from 20 percent to almost 25 percent between 1994 and 1996 and
then it decreases steadily. This pattern is slightly shifted compared to the unemployment
rate computed by use of the Labor Force Survey (see panel (b) in Figure 1): the year with
highest incidence of zeros is 1996, whereas the highest unemployment rate in the LFS is
in 1994.15
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the dispersion of individual wages per hour of work
as measured by use of several statistics: the variance of the logarithm, the gini index,
and the 50th-10th and 90th-50th percentile ratios. Both the variance and the gini index
increase between 1994 and 1997 and experience a large decrease afterwards. This fall in
inequality from 1998 to 1999 is driven by the fall in inequality at both ends of the wage
distribution. As Figure 4 shows, the 50th-10th percentile ratio uctuates around 1.77
until 1998 and decreases about 0.15 points in 1999. The 90th-50th percentile ratio grew
slightly from 1.98 to 2.05 before 1998 and decreases afterwards, slightly less than 0.15
points.
To understand the sources of changes in inequality for hourly wages, we can look at the
contribution of changes in the education premium, changes in the gender premium and
14Remember that we exclude self-employed workers from sample 3 because monthly labor earnings is
not available for them. Self-employed workers represent around 21% of the workforce
15Note, however, that Figure 1 plots the unemployment rate for individuals older than 16, whereas
here we focus on the sub-sample of those aged 25 to 60.
13Figure 3: Fraction of active individuals with zero earnings
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changes in the experience premium. We measure the education premium as the ratio of
the average hourly wage for workers with tertiary education and the average hourly wage
for the rest of workers. The gender premium is dened analogously. For the experience
premium we consider the ratio of average wage of workers aged 45-55 over the average
wage of workers aged 25-35. Figure 5 reports the evolution of these premia as well as
the evolution of variance of the residual of wages. The residual of wages is obtained
after taking out through a simple regression analysis the eects on wages (in logs) of year
dummies, a polynomial in the age of the household head, dummies for family composition
and a control for the educational level of husband and wife.16 The tertiary education
premium, panel (a), is stable until 1996 and then it decreases from about 1.57 to about
1.47 at the end of the decade. The gender premium, reported in panel (b), shows an
increasing trend that takes it from around 1.07 to 1.15 over the period.17 The experience
premium, panel (c), increases from about 1.2 in 1994 to around 1.45 in 1996 to remain
almost steady afterwards. Finally, in panel (d) we report the evolution of the variance of
the residual wage that is almost constant. The whole picture in Figure 5 indicates that
both changes in the education premium and the experience premium may be behind the
change in the variance of wages. In particular, the increase in the experience premium
would drive the increase in variance of wages over mid nineties and the decrease in the
tertiary education premium would drive the decrease in variance of wages at the very end
of the nineties.
16See equation (1) below for more details.
17These gures are lower than the 26.3 per cent reported by De la Rica, Dolado, and Llorens (2008)
for 1999 using the same data set. The dierence is explained by dierent sample selection. De la Rica,
Dolado, and Llorens (2008) exclude individuals with tertiary education, self-employed workers and those
working less than 15 hours. Furthermore, their sample includes individuals aged 16 to 65. However, the
key dierence is the exclusion of tertiary educated workers. The inclusion of this group of workers in
their sample would reduce the wage gender gap to 16.9.
14Figure 4: Inequality in individual wages
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During our sample period there is an important increase in the fraction of college ed-
ucated workers and female workers (see Figure 1). To check whether the premia reported
in Figure 5 arise because of these changes in the composition of the labor force we report
and alternative measure of each of the premia that controls for dierences in the other
observable variables. As Eckstein and Nagypal (2004), we run year by year Mincer regres-
sions of logged hourly wages against a dummy for tertiary education, a dummy for gender
and four age group dummies (25-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-60). We plot the coecients of these
estimates in Figure 6.18 The estimates show that the gross premia reect pretty well the
behavior of the more suitable estimates of premia that the Mincer regressions provide.
Indeed, in the same Figure 6 we report the raw premia in log wages for comparison. The
only important dierence is that the decrease in the tertiary education premium in terms
of Mincer regressions is more moderate than in terms of raw data, implying that the age
and sex composition changes of the tertiary educated is important to partially explain
the evolution of its trend over the end of the nineties.
The fall in the tertiary education premium is consistent with the phenomenon of over-
education in Spain. Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno (2000), using Labor Force Survey
data, nd evidence of a growing proportion of college graduated workers doing unskilled
18For the experience premium we plot the dierence between the coecients of the 46-55 and the 25-35
age dummies.
15Figure 5: Individuals wage premia
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Figure 6: Mincer coecients
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16Figure 7: Individuals inequality in labor supply
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jobs in Spain. A potential explanation for the increase in the experience premium that
we are reporting here may be based on the duality between permanent and xed term
contracts in Spain. Young workers entering the labor market are typically hired with
xed term contracts. De la Rica (2004), using the 1995 Wage Structure Survey, shows
that the raw wage gap between xed term contracts and permanent contracts in Spain
was 0.43, with 0.09 of it unexplained by observable dierences among workers (occupation
and individual characteristics). There are several possible explanations for a lower wage
rate associated to xed term contracts. For instance, workers under xed term contracts
may have less rm-specic human capital because they tend to change jobs very often.
Also, union coverage for this type of workers may be lower.
Finally, we complete the picture of the labor market evolution by looking at data of
hours. In Figure 7 we report the evolution of the variances of log wages and log hours
worked separately for men and women, together with the evolution of the correlation of
log wages and log hours and the evolution of the variance of the log of labor earnings.
As mentioned above, the variance of wages for all workers is increasing between 1994
and 1997 and decreasing afterwards. Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows that inequality in male
wages follows the same pattern, whereas inequality in female wages already starts falling
in 1995. There is very little action with hours. Panel (b) in Figure 7 shows that the
variance of hours is steady and very small, both for male and female workers. We nd
17that the variance in hours is much higher for females, which is explained by the lower
incidence of part-time employment among males than among females. Regarding the
correlations between wages and hours, panel (c) in Figure 7 shows that it is increasing all
over the period for males, whereas for females it increases much less and only until 1998
to decline a little afterwards. In addition, we observe that these correlations are negative.
Finally in panel (d) in Figure 7 we report the variance of log monthly earnings, which is
just the sum of the variances of wages and hours plus the covariance term. We observe
that, both for males and females, the pattern of inequality is almost identical to the one
for hourly wages. Inequality in labor earnings for males grows more between 1994 and
1997 than inequality in hourly wages because of the increase in the correlation between
hours and ages.
The negative correlation between wages and hours may arise as the result of individ-
uals using work hours as a self-insurance mechanism against shocks to hourly wages.19 If
individuals cannot use nancial markets or other private arrangements to smooth con-
sumption, they may need to work long hours when hourly wages are low.20 The fact
that the correlation for males has been increasing over time can be interpreted from two
dierent angles. First, it may be a pure composition eect: there has been an increase
in college workers and college workers earn more and work more hours. Second, it may
be a fall in the use of labor as a self-insurance mechanism. This means that, either in-
surance possibilities (through nancial markets or family) have improved, or rather that
the relative importance of transitory shocks has increased. Indeed, the estimation of a
wage process for hourly wages in Section 5 shows an increase in the importance of the
transitory shocks during this period. Regarding the dierence between men and women
in the correlation of hours and wages, we interpret the lower correlation for females as
the result of female labor supply being used as an insurance mechanism against heads
earnings shocks.21
As a nal remark, we should be cautious in interpreting the evolution of the variance
of wages and the evolution of the correlation of hours and wages. Part of the changes may
arise due to composition eects. The decrease in the unemployment rate, and the long
run demographic changes in the labor market that has brought more women and more
educated individuals into the labor market, are likely to play a role.22
To sum up. Between 1994 and 1997 inequality in hourly wages increased, with
the increase being mostly related to the increase in the experience premium. Then, in
1998 wage inequality started to decline, with the fall being mostly related to the tertiary
education premium. Inequality among wages of women did not follow this same pattern
because it started to fall before, in 1996. During the whole period the correlation between
19Of course, part of this comes from the division biased created by measurement error in hours.
20See Low (2005), Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008a).
21See Attanasio, Low, and S anchez-Marcos (2005)
22Note that according to the ECHP, the male employment rate (among the age range 25-60) has
increased from 74.6 per cent in 1994 to 83.7 per cent in 2001, mainly due to the reduction in the
unemployment rate. In the same period the female employment rate has increased from 35.9 per cent to
49.0 per cent, at least partially driven by the increase in female labor market participation over the last
decades.
18usual hours worked per week and hourly wages increased for male workers, which suggests
a lower use of labor supply as a self-insurance mechanism against uncertainty in the labor
market.
4.2 Inequality in labor earnings
In order to characterize the evolution of inequality of incomes in the labor market for the
whole period, we analyze the evolution of the dispersion of annual labor earnings in our
sample of household heads.23
Figure 8: Fraction of head participants who report zero earnings
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Note: the series yl refers to annual labor earnings; the series yl + ub refers to the sum of annual labor earnings and
unemployment insurance payments.
The incidence of zero labor earnings in this sample is substantially lower than in
the sample of individuals used in the previous section. There are two reasons for this.
First, the income data in the sample of heads refers to the year, so it takes much longer
unemployment spells to report zero labor earnings. Second, the demographic composition
of the sample of heads is dierent from the the demographic composition of the sample
of individuals: there are more men, they are older and they are less educated (the rst
two contribute to have a lower fraction of zeros in the head sample, but not the third).
Figure 8 plots the fraction of zeros for annual labor earning and annual labor earnings
plus unemployment benets. The levels in the two data sets are slightly dierent (this
is consistent with the small dierence in employment rates that we have documented in
23Recall that the reason to focus on household heads is twofold. First, information on education in the
ECPF is collected only for the heads. The education of the head is important because it is arguably one
of the most important determinants of labor earnings. Second, labor market status is only collected for
heads and spouses. This means that, for the other members of the household, it is impossible to know
whether zero labor earnings is the result of the unemployment experience in the labor market, or instead
it just reects non-participation.
19Figure 9: Inequality in head of household earnings
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Note: the series yl refers to annual labor earnings; the series yl + ub refers to the sum of annual labor earnings and
unemployment insurance payments.
Table 1 and with the discrepancies between data set in the lower tail of the distribution):
for instance, in the overlapping years the fraction of zeros in annual earnings is between
6% and 7% in the ECPF and between 8% and 9% in the ECHP. For the whole period
of study, the trend in the ECPF follows very well the trend in the unemployment rate
measured in the Labor Force Survey: in the expansion years between 1985 and 1992 the
fraction of zeros falls, then it increases substantially in the recession of the early nineties,
peaks in 1994, and falls again afterwards. The trend in the ECHP instead has the peak
in 1996.
In Figure 9 we plot the evolution of dierent statistics of inequality in labor earnings
and inequality in labor earnings plus unemployment benet. Panels (a) and (b) report
the variance of logs and the gini index. The rst thing to highlight is that there is a
substantial discrepancy in the level of inequality between the ECHP and the ECPF for
the four years in which the data sets overlap. In particular, inequality measured in the
ECHP is substantially higher than inequality measured in he ECPF. This is not only
due to the higher incidence of zeros reported in Figure 8 because, by construction, the
variance of logs omits the zeros and the dierence in inequality is also present.24 A second
important dierence comes from the comparison of monthly labor earnings in panel (c)
24Recall the discussion in Section 3.4 regarding the dierences in inequality between data sets.
20Figure 10: Percentiles of head earnings
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of Figure 7 (based on sample 3) and the annual labor earnings in panel (a) of Figure 9
(based on sample 2). We discuss this further in Section B.2.
Regarding the evolution of inequality for the whole period, we observe a clear pattern
of falling inequality. In particular, the ECPF shows a steady decline in the variance and
gini of labor earnings during the expansion of the 80's, which is stopped and slightly
reverted in the early 90's. Then, between 1994 and 1996 the variance of logs seems to
decline a little whereas the gini index uctuates a bit but its trend remains stable. For the
same period 1994 to 1996 the ECHP also shows a decline in the variance of logs (albeit
sharper than in the ECPF) and an un-trended uctuation in the gini index. Then, from
1996 onwards inequality falls steadily.
The decrease in the variances of earnings during the second half of the eighties that
we document in the ECPF is driven by a decrease in inequality in both tails of the
distribution. In particular, both the 90th-50th percentile ratio and the 50th-25th ratio
decline during the period (see panels (c) and (d) in Figure 9).25 Instead, the increase
in inequality that happens in 1993 seems to be present only in the lower tail: the 90th-
25We deviate here from the standard practice of reporting the 50th-10th percentile ratio to characterize
the lower tail of the wage distribution. This is because due to the incidence of unemployment the labor
earnings of the 10th percentile are zero or close to zero for some years.
2150th percentile ratio hardly changes whereas both the 50th-25th percentile ratio and the
fraction of individuals with zero earnings increase substantially. A more detailed picture of
the evolution of labor earnings at dierent points of the distribution is provided in panel
(a) of Figure 10. We report the evolution of head earnings in the ECPF, for dierent
percentiles of the distribution, as the log dierence with respect to its value in 1985. We
observe that the median income increased 22 percent between 1985 and 1992 (around 2.9
percent per year). During this same period, the income of the 25th percentile increased 41
percent (around 5 percent per year) whereas the incomes at the 90th and 95th percentile
fell until 1987 and then they increased for total increases of 16 and 10 percent respectively
until 1992 (around 2.1 and 1.6 percent per year). Instead, from 1993 onwards, income at
the median and at percentiles above the median stayed more or less stable (they decreased
slightly) whereas the income earned at the 25th percentile declined sharply until 1994,
around 8 percent in just two years, and recovered slightly afterwards.
Looking at the ECHP we observe again that the reduction of inequality between 1993
and 2000 is mostly related to the lower tail of the earnings distribution. Indeed, the
90th-50th ratio falls very little between 1994 and 2000 whereas both the 50th-25th ratio
and the incidence of zero earnings fall sharply from 1996 onwards. In Panel (b) of Figure
10 we see how income at all percentiles is stable until 1996 and then income at the 25th
percentile grows 30 percent between 1996 and 2000 whereas median income grows less
and incomes at the top percentiles grow around 10 percent during the same period.
During our sample period the unemployment rate in Spain was large and it experienced
large changes (see panel (b) of Figure 1). As Figure 8 shows, the incidence of zero labor
earnings for heads follows the same pattern. But even among those individuals that
report positive labor earnings, income variation within a year may be largely driven by
variation in the number of months in unemployment. For this reason, in Figure 9 we also
show the evolution of inequality of head earnings plus unemployment benets. By doing
so, dispersion in labor earnings will be less dramatic as we consider this extra source of
income available in case of unemployment. We nd that adding unemployment benets
lowers the level of inequality, mostly as measured by the 50th-25th percentile ratio, but it
does not change the trends. In addition, changes in inequality are much more moderate
at the lower tail of the distribution.
Next, we look at possible causes for the observed evolution of earnings inequality. In
Figure 11 we report the tertiary education premium, the gender premium, the experience
premium and residual inequality. We observe that the quality of the match between the
two data sets in 1993, the rst overlapping year, is very high for the three premia and
that the disparity in inequality between data sets in this year seems to be mainly due to
residual wage inequality. In the subsequent overlapping years, 1994, 1995 and 1996, the
tertiary education premium and the gender premium start to spread apart. Regarding
the evolution of the premia in labor earnings of the head over the whole sample period,
the most remarkable feature is the large drop in the tertiary education premium, which
was around 115 percent in 1985 and 75 percent in 2000. The gender premium also falls
substantially between 1985 and 2000, from 45 percent to 15 percent. Together with these
drops, we nd an important increase in the experience premium, from -10 percent in 1985
22Figure 11: Labor earnings premia I
85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
1.75
1.85
1.95
2.05
2.15
(a) Tertiary Education Premium
85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
1.05
1.15
1.25
1.35
1.45
(b) Gender Premium
85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
0.85
0.95
1.05
1.15
1.25
1.35
(c) Experience Premium
85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
0.30
0.45
0.60
0.75
(d) Residual
Figure 12: Labor earnings premia II
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23to around 30 percent in 2000. Finally, the variance of the residual of head earnings is
decreasing.
A cleaner picture of the premia is provided in Figure 12. In panels (a), (b) and (c),
we plot the estimated coecients in the Mincer regressions. We also report in the same
Figure 12 the premia of the logged labor earnings for comparison. Recall that the premia
in Figure 11 are computed including individuals with zero labor earnings whereas the
premia of the logs in Figure 12, by construction, drop the zeros (as it also happens with
the coecients of the Mincer regressions).
Regarding the tertiary education premium, we nd four important dierences in Figure
12. First, the premium in logs is substantially smaller than the premium in levels. Second,
the fall in the premium in logs is half as big as the fall in the premium in logs: over the
whole sample period the premium in levels falls from 115 percent to 75 percent, whereas
the premium of the logs moves from 80 percent to 60 percent. Third, during the recession
years in the early nineties the tertiary education premium in levels increased whereas
the one in logs stayed stable. These three facts suggest that the unemployment risk is
lower for highly educated workers, that the fall in unemployment rate over the whole
period beneted more the highly educated, and that the destruction of employment in
the recession of the early nineties was specially severe for non college workers. The fourth
important dierence is that the decrease in the tertiary education premium between 1996
and 2000 measured in the ECHP is more moderate when we use the Mincer coecients
than the gross premium in logs. This was also the case when we looked at hourly wages
with the sample of individuals in Section 4.1. This suggests that changes in the age and
sex composition of the tertiary educated group may have played a role in the decrease
in the tertiary education premium for those years. This would be consistent with the
entrance of new cohorts of young workers which are more educated and more balanced in
sexes. We will come back to this point in Section 4.3.
Regarding the experience premium, Figure 12 shows three important dierences. First,
between 1985 and 1996 in the ECPF, the premium in logs is around 10 percentage points
smaller than the premium in levels, but the rates of growth are very similar. Second, the
ECHP shows that between 1993 and 2000 the experience premium in levels kept growing
but the premium of the logs remained stable. These two ndings are consistent with the
fact that the unemployment rate was larger for young workers and that the unemployment
increase in the recession of the early 90's was specially severe for them. Finally, in the
ECHP the mincer coecients are around 5 percentage points larger than the raw premium
of the logs, which is consistent with the fact that the pool of older workers contains less
educated people.
The pattern of falling inequality in the labor market had already been documented
elsewhere. Abadie (1997) uses the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF) of 1980 and
1990 to compare the cross-sectional distribution of annual earnings of household heads.
He nds a fall in overall inequality and a fall in the returns to college.26 Hidalgo (2008)
26The sampling and questions in the EPF are very similar to the ones in the ECPF. The main dierence
is that the EPF is a cross-section taken every 10 years, with a larger sample size. Incidentally, the
24combines data from the EPF and the ECPF to look at the evolution of annual earnings
of heads of single-earner households. He also nds that both inequality and returns to
college fall from 1980 to 1990. However, he documents a slight increase in inequality and
returns to college in 2000. There are two main factors that can explain this dierence.
The rst one is that Hidalgo (2008) looks at a sample of households with only one earner,
which, as Table 1 above shows, is a sample with a rapidly changing composition. The
second factor is that the data of Hidalgo (2008) for 2000 come from a new version of the
ECPF, while our data for the second half of the 90's come from the ECHP. The new
version of the ECPF has a number of problems that makes it very dicult to compare
to the old one.27 In contrast with these results, Arellano, Bentolila, and Bover (2002)
nd an increase in the college premium between 1980 and 1987 when looking at a data
base of Social Security Administration records. This data set is very interesting because
it collects administrative data for the 5 percent of the universe of Spanish workers at a
monthly frequency. However, it has a severe problem with top-coding: for college workers
even the earnings at the median are unobservable.
The simultaneous increase in the experience premium and fall in the tertiary education
premium seem to be in contradiction: education and experience are two dierent measures
of skill, if returns to skill have increased over the period one would expect both premia
to increase. However, following Katz and Murphy (1992), the changes in relative supplies
of dierent types of workers together with a skill-biased demand shift may explain this.
Figure 2 shows that the share of workers of dierent age groups in the workforce has
not changed during the sample period. Hence, the increase in the experience premium
must reect a demand shift for this type of skill. Instead, Figure 2 shows a substantial
increase in the supply of tertiary educated workers; this means that we may still have
a college-biased demand shift that has not been large enough to oset the increase in
supply. An alternative explanation is that there has been no skill-biased demand shift in
Spain. If we measure experience not as age but as the sum of actual hours of work, the
massive entrance of female workers into the labor force would imply a fall of experience
despite the fact that the average age of the workforce has not change much. Then, the
increase in the experience premium and the fall in the education premium would be just
driven by supply factors. The rst explanation would make Spain singular because the
increase in the experience premium would be demand-driven instead of supply-driven, as
it has been argued to be the case in the US and France by Wasmer (2001) and Jeong,
Kim, and Manovskii (2008). The second explanation would make Spain singular because
of the absence of skill-biased demand shifts.
To sum up. The evolution of inequality in labor earnings between 1985 and 2000
in Spain is very singular. While countries such as the US, the UK, Italy or Germany
experienced increases of inequality of dierent sizes, the experience of Spain was a clear
fall in inequality. In addition, it is also singular the fall in the tertiary education premium
denition of household head in both surveys is the same.
27The ECPF was stopped in 1996. In 1998 a new survey was started to replace it. However, this new
survey reports income data in very wide brackets for a fraction of 4/5 of all households. Besides, the
income data is reported for the whole household. This makes the comparison of inequality with the old
ECPF very problematic.
25over the whole period. We nd that part of this fall shall be attributed to the reduction in
unemployment, which was aecting low skilled workers more than college educated ones.
The fall in inequality was present in both tails of the distribution during the expansion
years 1985-1992. However, the recession of 1993 implied a sharp increase in inequality
mostly concentrated in the lower tail of the distribution. At least part of this was due to
the large surge of unemployment. As the recession waned and the unemployment rate fell,
inequality decreased again but only in the lower tail of the distribution. The reduction
of inequality between 1985 and 1992 was partly generated by the reduction in the gender
premium and the reduction in the tertiary education premium. In contrast, the experience
premium increased over this same period.
4.3 The fall in the college premium and the increase of young college workers
As we argue in the Introduction, the period 1985-2000 witnessed important demographic
changes in the Spanish labor market. Panel (c) in Figure 1 shows that the share of college
educated workers raises from 10 to almost 20 percent between 1985 and 2000. The gradual
increase in the college workers is due to the large increase in college graduates of the young
cohorts entering the labor force. If returns to college are age-dependent, and in particular
if they increase with experience, the observed fall in the college premium could be largely
driven by the fall in the average experience of the pool of college workers (compositional
eect).
To look into this possibility, we use our samples of household heads of the ECPF and
the ECHP and compute the life-cycle prole of the college premium by dividing annual
earnings of college graduates and annual earnings of the rest of workers at every age.
We do as in Section 6 and for the ECPF sample we provide a life-cycle prole when
controlling for year eects and when controlling for cohort eects. For the ECHP sample
we provide a life-cycle prole when controlling for year eects only. In panel (a) of Figure
13 we report for the ECPF the age proles of the college premia in logs as dierence of
the college premia at age 25. We nd that the college premium grows substantially over
the life cycle, at least until age 45 or so. When controlling for year eects (see the solid
line) the increase is of around 40 percentage points until age 50, and the prole decreases
afterwards. When controlling for cohort eects (see the dashed line), the increase is not
so large, around 25 percentage points until age 45, and there is again a fall afterwards.
In panel (b) of Figure 13 we report the age prole of the college premium in the ECHP.
For this data set we obtain an almost linear increase over the life cycle, with the college
premium being 70 percentage points larger for 50 years old workers than for young workers.
Hence, our data seem to conrm an interaction between experience and education such
that the returns to college are larger for more experienced workers.
To check whether the fall over time of the college premium is due to the entrance in
the labor force of young and unexperienced college graduates, we run again our Mincer re-
gressions, but adding now interaction terms. In particular we regress log earnings against
the gender dummy, the experience dummies and the experience dummies multiplied by
the college dummy. In panel (c) of Figure 13 we report the coecient of these interaction
26Figure 13: College premium and age
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terms for the ECPF. We observe that the college premium is actually falling for the age
groups 25-35, 36-45 and 46-55, while for the older workers it seems untrended. This age
group has fewer workers and very few college graduates, which makes the premium uctu-
ate substantially during the period.28 In panel (d) of Figure 13 we report the coecients
of the interaction terms for the ECHP. Again we nd a clear falling pattern for the age
groups 25-35 and 46-55, whereas for the other two groups there seems to be no clear trend.
Therefore, the fall in the college premium seems to be present within age groups in both
samples, except in the group of the oldest workers.
To sum up. It is hard to believe that the fall in the college premium seen in Spain
is an artifact of a a fall in the average age of the pool of graduates. Of course, if workers
of dierent ages are poor substitutes, the big entrance of young college graduates in the
labor force could explain the clear fall in the college premium of the young workers. But
it would not explain the fall in the college premium of older workers.
28The coecients on the gender dummy and the experience dummies display the same patterns as in
the Mincer equations without interactions that we showed in Section 4.1.Therefore we do not report them
here.
274.4 Inequality in income at the household level
To describe the evolution of inequality at the household level, we start by aggregating labor
earnings for all members of the household. We look at dierent versions of this variable.
First, the raw data. Second, to account for dierences in household size, we normalize
household labor earnings by the OECD scale equivalences. And third, we decompose the
variance of the equivalized data into dierent parts. For this decomposition we regress
equivalized household labor earnings yi;t against time dummies Dt, a vector of education
dummies De
i;t, a vector of family composition dummies D
f
i;t and an age polynomial ft (Ai;t),
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Figure 14 plots the evolution of dierent inequality statistics for equivalized household
labor earnings: the variance of logs in panel (a), the gini index in panel (b), the 50th-
10th percentile ratio in panel (c), and the 90th-50th percentile ratio in panel (d). Both
the variance of logs and the gini index display very similar patterns. The series from
the ECPF show that household earnings inequality falls until 1992, it increases sharply
between 1992 and 1993 and then stabilizes between 1993 and 1996. The series from the
ECHP, however, display a slight fall in inequality between 1993 and 1996. Then, from
1996 to 2000 there is again a sharp fall of inequality. As with the labor earnings of heads,
the 50th-10th percentile ratio moves along with the variance and gini, which tells that
changes at the lower tail are important. However, contrary to individual level data, the
90th-50th percentile ratio also shows the same pattern. In particular, the increase in
inequality between 1992 and 1993 was not apparent in the upper tail of the earnings of
heads but it is very sharp in the upper tail of labor earnings at the household level. One
potential explanation is that only families at the very top of the distribution were not
suering the unemployment crisis, whereas families at the median may have had one of
the family earners suering unemployment for a while.
In panel (a) of Figure 15 we plot together the evolution of the variance of log raw
earnings and the variance of log equivalized earnings (the series analyzed in Figure 14)
for the two data sets. We nd that the pattern described by the equivalized series is
very similar to the pattern of the raw series, with the level of inequality measured with
the raw earnings being slightly lower. Figure 15 also let us analyze the results of the
decomposition of variance done with the regression described in equation (1). We observe
that the variance of the residual component accounts for around 76 to 80 percent of total
variance. Of the observable components, education of the head is the most important and
it accounts for around 11 to 16 percent of total variance. Both the residual component
and the education component track the pattern of inequality described by the equivalized
series. Family composition and age are much less important, with their contributions
to total variance uctuating around 5 and 2 percent respectively. Finally, despite the
28Figure 14: Inequality in equivalized household labor earnings
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dierence in overall inequality between the two data sets, it is remarkable that the variance
decomposition of equivalized earnings preserves the same proportion for each component
across data sets.
The comparison between this decomposition and the premia for head earnings reported
in Figures 11 and 12 is also interesting. The decrease in the variance of the education
component of earnings is consistent with the decrease in the tertiary education premium.
However, the stability of the contribution of age to explain the variance of household
earnings contrasts with the large increase in the experience premium that we reported
above. The main reason for this discrepancy is that labor supply and labor earnings of
spouses (and other members of the household) may have increased more among households
with young heads, which would compensate the larger labor earnings of older workers.
This is a reasonable explanation because the increase in female participation has aected
particularly the younger cohorts.29
Next, we examine how inequality in labor market earnings and inequality in other
sources of income add up to inequality in household disposable income. We focus on
29Other explanations may rely on the dierent categorization of age in the two dierent exercises.
Although inequality between age groups 25-35 and 45-55 has increased, inequality within those age
groups may have fallen. Indeed, we actually nd a fall in inequality for workers within the age range
45-55 in the ECPF and a fall in inequality within age group 25-35 in the ECHP.
29Figure 15: Earnings inequality and its decomposition
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a series of intermediate income variables: head earnings, household earnings, household
earnings plus private transfers, household earnings plus private and public transfers (un-
employment benets, disability and retirement pensions, and other public transfers), and
nally, we build household disposable income by adding nancial income to the previous
one. Figures 16 and 17 plots the evolution of inequality (variance of the logs) for these
series in the ECPF and the ECHP respectively, together with the evolution of inequality
for the labor earnings of the head. The relative importance of the dierent sources of
income in terms of inequality is similar across the two data sets.
First the level of inequality in household earnings is slightly higher than the level of
inequality in head earnings for most of the periods. In the ECPF both series experience a
sharp decline between 1985 and 1991, an increase between 1991 and 1993, and nally they
remain stable afterwards. Starting in 1993, however, both series seem to spread apart with
inequality in household earnings staying stable whereas inequality in head earnings falling
slightly. In the ECHP the variance of earnings of the household is also above inequality
in head earnings in the period 1993 to 1996, although the dierence seems smaller than in
the ECPF. However, between 1998 and 2000 the inequality in the earnings of the heads
and the inequality in the earnings of the household are identical. The relatively higher
inequality of household earnings with respect to head earnings suggests that the earnings
of the other household members become larger for households where the earnings of the
head are already large. This may be due to the existence of some assortative mating
which generates a positive correlation between the education of head and wife. This is
30Figure 16: From individual earnings to household disposable income, ECPF
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specially important for Spain as the labor market participation for females is strongly
related to education. However, the more recent reduction in the impact on households
inequality of other members of household may reect the fact that the increase in female
employment during the second half of the 90's has been more dramatic for women with
secondary education.
Second, private transfers seem to be relatively unimportant: the series of household
earnings with private transfers is extremely similar to the household earnings. Public
transfers, instead, are important. Adding them to the series of household earnings plus
private transfers decreases the level of inequality about one third. In addition, the changes
over time are much milder at least until the mid nineties: the fall in inequality between
1985 and 1991 is much smaller than for household earnings or household earnings plus
private transfers, and so is the increase afterwards. There is a discrepancy here between
the two data sets, whereas according to the ECPF inequality in head and household earn-
ings is quite stable between 1993 and 1996, according to the ECHP there is a substantial
reduction in inequality, although household earnings plus private and public transfers is
stable in the two data sets.
Third, the addition of nancial income to build the series of disposable income hardly
changes anything in the ECPF: the level of inequality is slightly smaller and the trends are
identical. However, the picture is very dierent when we look at the ECHP: the addition
of nancial income increases household inequality substantially and specially since 1996.
As a consequence, in the ECHP we detect that nancial income has limited the fall of
inequality originated in the labor market. Part of the discrepancy between data sets may
31Figure 17: From individual earnings to household disposable income, ECHP
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come from the very poor data on nancial income for this survey. Recall that nancial
income of the ECPF hardly aggregates to one third of its National Accounts counterpart.
But a more substantive explanation might be based on the fact that Spain has experienced
a dramatic increase in terms of households nancial market participation over the period
of analysis. In 1985 65% of household's nancial assets were bank deposit, whereas the
gure goes down to 33% in 1999 in favor of equity markets. It seems that the higher
access to the nancial markets has not been equally spread across households.
The evolution of inequality in household disposable income described in Figures 16
and 17 is consistent with previous ndings. Oliver, Ramos, and Raymond-Bara (2001),
using the ECPF, also document the fall in inequality until 1992, the increase in 1993 and
the stability until 1996. Ayala and Sastre (2007), using the ECHP, also document the
fall of inequality in household earnings between 1993 and 2000 and the stable pattern for
inequality in household disposable income over the same period.
One potential explanation for the observed decrease in income inequality may be given
by the changes in the personal income tax code that we mentioned in section 2. Recall
that all income data in both surveys are after taxes. For the ECHP we can assess the
role of changes in the personal income tax codes because this data set reports both before
and after tax income measures. In Section B.2 we look at these two income denitions
in detail. We nd that the evolution of inequality in individual labor earnings is almost
identical for both series. Therefore, we conclude that the changes in the tax system
cannot be a major explanation for the fall in inequality between Spanish households, at
least between 1993 and 2000.
32To sum up. The evolution of inequality in labor earnings at the household level
and inequality of disposable income at the household level are not too dierent from the
evolution of inequality in the earnings of heads. The two most remarkable dierences
are the following. First, the increase in inequality of earnings at the household level in
the recession of the early 90's did aect the upper tail: household earnings at the top
percentiles increased with respect to household earnings at the median. This did not
happen at the individual level. Second, nancial income eroded the fall of inequality in
labor earnings that happened between 1996 and 2000. It is noteworthy that the family
does not seem to have been a good insurance mechanism in Spain: inequality in labor
earnings at the household level is not smaller than inequality of labor earnings of heads.
In addition, private transfers, which may largely come from other households related by
blood, play a very minor role. Instead, government transfers are the most important
income source in terms of reducing inequality between households.
4.5 Inequality in consumption
We follow the evolution of inequality in non-durable consumption from 1984 to 1996 by
use of the ECPF. The main nding about consumption inequality is that it falls over
the period, but the fall is very small compared to the fall of inequality in disposable
income. In panel (a) of Figure 18 we report the variance of raw consumption, equivalized
consumption and residual consumption. In panel (b) of Figure 18 we report the variance
explained by age, family composition and education.30 We see a very small fall of around
2 percentage points in inequality of raw consumption. This fall is not uniform. Indeed,
the variance of log consumption falls around 3 percentage points between 1985 and 1990.
Then, there is a slight increase of consumption inequality until 1992 and nally it remains
stable afterwards. The variance of equivalized consumption follows a similar pattern with
similar magnitudes in the changes. However, inequality in equivalized consumption does
not grow between 1990 and 1992, it increases in 1993 and remains stable afterwards.
The decomposition of the variance shows that residual variance is the most important
component, accounting for around 80 percent of total variance. Among the observable
components, education accounts for around 13 percent, family composition accounts for
around 5 percent and age accounts for less than 1 percent. These gures are very similar
to the ones found in the decomposition of the variance of equivalized disposable income.
The evolution of inequality in equivalized consumption is largely driven by the residual
component. Instead, the consumption variance due to observable components evolves
somewhat dierently. The education and family components fall between 1985 and 1988
and then they increase until 1994 and 1993 respectively. Between 1994 and 1996 the
variance of the education components falls and the variance of the education components
increases.
A more careful look at the evolution of inequality in equivalized consumption is re-
ported in Figure 19. Panels (a) and (b) report the evolution of the variance of log equival-
30This decomposition is the same as in the analysis of household labor earnings.
33Figure 18: Consumption inequality and its decomposition
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34Figure 19: From disposable income to consumption
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ized consumption and the gini index of the same variable in levels. Panels (c) and (d) plot
the 50th-10th and 90th-50th percentile ratios. The gini index reproduces the decrease in
inequality between 1985 and 1990 measured by the variance, and also the increase during
the recession in 1993 and the relative stability afterwards. Interestingly, the decline of
consumption inequality at the lower tail of the distribution does not stop in 1990 but it
goes on until 1992 and then it increases sharply in 1993 and 1994. Hence, the relative
stability in overall inequality in the years between 1990 and 1992 comes from the fact that
inequality in the upper tail increases during this period: the 90th-50th percentile ratio
also falls until 1990 but it increases afterwards.
In order to compare the fall in consumption inequality to the fall in household dispos-
able income, in Figure 19 we also plot the measures of inequality for household disposable
income. The dispersion of income is larger than dispersion of consumption for all inequal-
ity measures. This means that changes in asset position are used to smooth out income
uctuations, so at least part of the heterogeneity in income is not permanent. Regarding
the trends, the fall of inequality in income during the expansion years of the eighties and
early nineties is substantially larger than the fall of inequality in consumption. Then the
recession of the early nineties comes with an increase of inequality in income that is also
larger than the increase in consumption inequality. The fact that changes in consumption
inequality are smaller than changes in disposable income inequality seems to suggest that
changes in inequality are largely driven by changes in the dispersion of the transitory
component of labor earnings. We will discuss this issue further in Section 5.
35It is interesting to look at the lower tail of the distribution during the recession. The
50th-10th percentile ratio of consumption increases as much as the one of disposable in-
come. This suggests that at the low end of the distribution the income fall in the recession
was very dicult to insure. We might think that this is because the unemployment shock
was perceived as having permanent eects in life-time income or rather because house-
holds faced borrowing constrains. The second explanation may be more plausible because
in 1995 the 50th-10th ratio of consumption falls again whereas the one for income keeps
increasing.
To sum up. Consumption inequality fell between 1985 and 1996, but much less than
household income inequality. All the reduction in consumption inequality is concentrated
in the expansion years between 1985 and 1990. In 1991 and 1992, income inequality fell
but consumption inequality did not. Then, consumption inequality increases with the
recession in 1993 but it does not fall again as the economy recovers. This suggests that,
while the economic expansion in the second half of the 80's managed to reduce somewhat
permanent sources of inequality among households, the expansion of the second half of
the 90's failed to do so.
5 Estimation of Stochastic Wage and Earnings Process
In the previous sections we have seen that residual or within skill inequality is a big com-
ponent of total dispersion in hourly wages and household labor earnings. In this section
we estimate a stochastic process for the residual component for both variables. The esti-
mates of these processes may be useful to understand and interpret the trends in earnings
and consumption inequality that we have described in previous sections. A stochastic
process for individual hourly wages may be useful as an input for macroeconomic models
that explicitly model the decision of hours worked at the individual level. The stochas-
tic process for household labor earnings may be useful as an ingredient for models that
abstract from the labor supply decision and take the household as its decision unit.
We assume the following statistical model
lnyit = x
0
it t + it + "it with "it  N(0;
2
t) (2)
where yit is either hourly wage or household income, xit represents a vector of controls
including year, age, family composition and education dummies,  t represents a vector of
time varying coecients, "it represents the transitory component of the income innovations
and it represents the permanent component of the income innovations,
it = it 1 + it with it  N(0;
2
t) (3)
We assume that it and "it are i.i.d. across agents, that E("is;it) = 0 and E("is;"it) =
E(is;it) = 0 for all s 6= t: So we allow both the variance of the transitory component
and the variance of the permanent shock to be time-varying.
365.1 The ECHP
We use our sample of heads (sample 2) to estimate the stochastic processes for hourly
wages and individual earnings in the ECHP. The proposed stochastic process is adequate
at the annual frequency because typically, if one takes the growth rate of the income
residual, the autocovariances of second order and above are not statistically dierent
from zero.31 We evaluate whether our data from the ECHP conforms to this statistical
model. Let's dene,
git = (lnyit   x
0
it t)   (lnyit 1   x
0
it 1 t 1) (4)
Then we estimate the autocovariances of git in our sample. In Table 3 we provide the
unconditional autocovariances by year up to order seven (the maximum that is possible
to estimate with our data) and their standard errors.32 We do so for both head's wage
and household earnings. We nd that the covariances of order j = 0 and j = 1 are clearly
statistically dierent from zero. Autocovariances at the second order and beyond are not
statistically dierent from zero, with the exception of the autocovariances at the second
order for the household earning and the fourth order for the head's wage.
Table 3: Autocovariances of the unexplained growth
Order Head wage Hhold Earnings
0 0.0773 (0.0015) 0.4769 (0.0123)
1 -0.0311 (0.0011) -0.1645 (0.0088)
2 -0.0007 (0.0010) -0.0192 (0.0070)
3 0.0006 (0.0012) -0.0005 (0.0080)
4 -0.0024 (0.0013) 0.0014 (0.0082)
5 0.0019 (0.0017) -0.0100 (0.0112)
6 -0.0017 (0.0024) 0.0150 (0.0175)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Next, we estimate the processes for wages of the head and for labor labor earnings
of the household, and we plot them in Figure 20. Recall that wages are computed using
monthly earnings whereas household earnings are computed using annual variables. Re-
garding the process for the head's wage, we nd that both the variance of the transitory
and permanent shocks are small in size and steady until 1996, with the variance of the
transitory shock being larger. However, the variance of the transitory component shows
an increasing trend starting in 1996, whereas the variance of the permanent shock be-
comes more volatile but still un-trended. Concerning the process for household earnings,
31Abowd and Card (1989) and more recently Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) nd instead that, for annual
earnings, the second autocovariance is also dierent from zero with PSID data. However, as these articles
show, it is easy to accommodate the process above by just allowing an MA(1) term in the transitory
component.
32We follow the standard methods described in Abowd and Card (1989).
37the variance of the transitory and the permanent components are of similar size.33 Both
present a smooth decreasing trend over the period, which is slightly more pronounced
for the permanent component. In the case of the permanent component the decrease is
concentrated between 1993 and 1996. This decrease could be driven by the reduction in
unemployment that happened after 1993. If this is the case, it seems that the reduction
in unemployment aected the permanent component of earnings as well as its transitory
component, in particular during the rst years of recovery. This suggests that there are
human capital losses associated to unemployment spells and that the focus of public poli-
cies should not be only in terms of unemployment insurance but also in terms of human
capital formation of the unemployed. However, as a word of caution, the fall in the dis-
persion of shocks to household earnings does not appear with the ECPF data (see next
sub-section) and the fall in the permanent component of earnings between 1993 and 1996
is inconsistent with the stable consumption inequality over the same period.
5.2 The ECPF
With the ECPF we cannot estimate a process for hourly wages. We estimate instead
a process for labor earnings of the head with sample 2 as well as processes for labor
earnings of the household and disposable income for the household with sample 1. We
need to estimate these processes at a quarterly frequency. The ECPF follows households
up to 8 quarters. If we aggregated our quarterly data at the annual level, we would lose
most of our panel dimension since we would end up with at most two yearly observations
per household. With quarterly data we can build 7 observations of residual wage growth
git per individual. It is not clear that the proposed income process suits well quarterly level
data since at this frequency the growth of income residuals tends to be autocorrelated at
higher lags than j = 1. We however proceed with this specication and refer the reader to
Albarran, Carrasco, and Martinez-Granado (2007) for a more complete estimation using
a dierent sample of the ECPF.34
Figure 21 plots the results. Regarding the levels, for the three variables the dispersion
of the transitory component is larger than the dispersion of the innovations in the perma-
nent component. This is particularly acute for household disposable income. Regarding
the trends over the period, the three variables display a similar pattern. The variance of
innovations of the permanent component falls sharply during the economic expansion of
the second half of the 80's, but this decrease stops in the rst quarter of 89. Then, it
remains stable, for household earnings and disposable income and it increases slightly for
33The dispersion of the shocks to household earnings is much larger than the one of the shocks to
wages. This is because the dispersion in the labor earnings denition at the annual level is much larger
than the dispersion in labor earnings at the monthly denition. See Appendix B.2 for details.
34Albarran, Carrasco, and Martinez-Granado (2007) report that residual income growth is autocorre-
lated until the 5th lag. We also estimate the autocovariances of git and their standard errors for every
year. Our estimates (not reported here) show that autocovariances of order 0 and 1 are strongly signi-
cant for every year, while the rest of autocovariances are non-signicant for some years and signicant for
some others. However, when they are signicant, their point estimate is one order of magnitude smaller
than the one for the autocovariance for j = 1.
38Figure 20: Estimated coecient of the stochastic wage and income process, ECHP
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Figure 21: Estimated coecient of the stochastic income process, ECPF
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39head earnings. The variance of the transitory component does not change much.
These results are consistent with some of our ndings in previous sections. In partic-
ular, consumption inequality only falls between 1985 and 1990 and our estimates show
that the permanent component of earnings falls only during this same period. However,
the sharp decrease in the permanent component of earnings or income seems a little bit
inconsistent with the mild fall of inequality in consumption. There are dierent ways to
think about this. First, maybe the parsimonious description of the income process is too
simple and we would need to model the transitory shock with a longer lag structure. Sec-
ond, we may think that the permanent transitory decomposition identied with income
data alone is not good enough. A solution would be to use the moments of consumption
growth as Blundell and Preston (1998) to help identify permanent and transitory shocks.35
And third, maybe Spanish households cannot insure transitory shocks very well. Notice
that for household disposable income, the permanent component represents a small part
of overall uncertainty. If transitory shocks are dicult to insure, then part of the overall
dispersion in consumption inequality also comes from transitory shocks and hence the
decrease in the permanent component of earnings shocks decreases little the dispersion of
consumption. However, preliminary results in Casado (2009) suggest that Spanish house-
holds do insure very well against transitory shocks (whereas only 1/4 of permanent shocks
do not get transmitted to consumption). This is similar to what Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008) nd for the US.
6 Life-Cycle Proles
In order to characterize how the dispersion of dierent variables changes as households
age, we have to face the standard problem of disentangling age eects, cohort eects and
year eects. One typical approach, see for instance Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2005), is to ignore alternatively cohort eects and year eects and then analyze the
age proles of our statistics of interest under both cases. Let's dene M (a;y) as our
statistic of interest computed for individuals of given age a in a given year y. We can
analogously dene M (a;k) as the same statistic computed for individuals of age a and
cohort k. For our analysis we will consider of age a all individuals whose age is in the
interval [a   2;a + 2]. For the cohorts we will consider ve-year intervals for the year
of birth. Then, to obtain the age proles controlling for year eects we regress M (a;y)
against a full set of year dummies and age dummies or a polynomial on age. To obtain the
age proles controlling for cohort eects we regress M (a;k) against a full set of cohort
dummies and age dummies. In this section we focus only on the results ignoring cohort
eects. In Appendix B.3 we also provide the results ignoring year eects, which have very
similar implications. For the life cycle analysis we do not mix our data sets. In Section 6.1
we use sample 2 of the ECHP to describe the evolution over the life-cycle of the dispersion
35Indeed, Albarran, Carrasco, and Martinez-Granado (2007), also using the ECPF, do allow for a
longer lag structure in the transitory shock and use consumption data to separate the persistent and
transitory components. However, they nd an increase in the permanent component of income over the
sample period.
40in hourly wages, the dispersion in hours, the correlation between these two variables and
the dispersion in monthly earnings. In Section 6.2 we use samples 1 and 2 of the ECPF
to describe the evolution over the life-cycle of the dispersion of dierent household level
income and consumption variables as well as individual labor earnings.
6.1 Inequality in hourly wages and labor supply
In this sub-section we use sample 2 of the ECHP to report the life-cycle proles for the
dispersion in hourly wages, hours of work, labor earnings and the correlation between
wages and hours. To be consistent with our denition of hourly wages, our denition of
labor earnings is going to be the monthly measure. The large incidence of unemployment
and its dierent impact at dierent ages make us think that selection may play a role in
the observed proles for wages, hours and earnings. For this reason, we start by plotting
in Figure 22 the fraction, at each age, of heads who participate in the labor market and
report zero monthly earnings. We nd that at age 55 there is a very large increase in
the fraction of heads who report zero earnings. This conrms the larger incidence of
unemployment for older workers.36 We think that part of this increase in unemployment
may be explained by the fact that workers who get unemployed at age 58 or older may
not have incentives to work again as the public unemployment insurance system (that
provides an unemployment benet up to two years) pays their corresponding contribution
to the pension system to qualify for early retirement at age 60.
Figure 22: Fraction of head participants who report zero earnings, ECHP
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Regarding the life-cycle prole of the variance of the head's wage, panel (a) in Figure
23 shows that it increases around 14 percentage points between ages 25 and 60, with the
36In fact, using data from the Labor Force Survey 1993-2000, we also nd that male unemployment
rate increases at the end of the life-cycle, in particular it goes from 9% at 45 to 14% at 59, decreasing
then to around 10% at age 60 as some people get retired.
41Figure 23: Inequality over the life-cycle controlling year eects, ECHP
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
(a) Head wage
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
(d) Head monthly earnings
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
 (b) Variance of hours, heads
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−0.50
−0.40
−0.30
−0.20
−0.10
 (c) Correlation of hours and wages, heads
overall prole being slightly concave. Two interpretations may be given to such prole.
First, labor market shocks have less than unitary persistence. Alternatively, we may think
that the selection process that increases the fraction of heads reporting zero earnings from
age 50 shapes the prole, that would show linear growth otherwise. This should be the
case if heads at the tails of the distribution are those who exit the labor market earlier.
Then the prole would be consistent with a unit root for the persistent shock once selection
is taken into account. In panel (b) Figure 23 we see that the age prole for hours is U-
shaped, which means that the heterogeneity in hours for young heads decreases as they
age, but then in the mid 40's dispersion starts to increase. Note that since our denition of
hours is usual weekly hours this is completely unrelated to unemployment, except perhaps
for the selection of which individuals are included in the sample. The correlation of hours
and wages, which is reported in panel (c) of Figure 23, is negative, as in section 4.1, even
once we condition on age. This is important because it shows that the negative correlation
between wages and hours found in the cross-section is not an artifact of the life-cycle: in
principle, if old workers (who have higher wages on average) work less hours than young
workers a negative correlation could appear. The correlation increases sharply with age, at
least until age 50 and falls a little after that. This is consistent with the interpretation that
Spanish workers use labor supply as an insurance mechanism. In presence of borrowing
constraints, the only way for a young worker to smooth consumption when facing bad
shocks is by working longer hours. As workers age, they accumulate assets and make lesser
42use of hours of work as a tool for smoothing consumption and hence hours track wages
more closely. A potential explanation for the fall in the correlation for older workers can
be found in the social security system. Pension benets are a function of the contributions
over the 8 years prior to retirement.37 Individuals with low wages at the end of the life-
cycle may nd it protable to work harder in order to qualify for a higher pension upon
retirement. Finally, in panel (d) of Figure 23 we see that the variance of monthly earnings
of the head increases linearly with age, around 20 percentage points until age 60. Before
age 50, the prole is steeper than the one for wages as a result of the increasing correlation
of wages and hours along the life-cycle (and in spite of the slight decrease in the variances
of hours). Furthermore, the constant growth rate of the monthly earnings prole after
age 50 contrasts with the decreasing growth rate of the wage prole and the decreasing
correlation prole, and it seems to be driven by the increase in the variance of hours.
6.2 Inequality in income and consumption
In this section we use our samples of heads and households from the ECPF to characterize,
between 1985 and 1996, the evolution of inequality in individual labor earnings, household
labor earnings, household disposable income and household consumption. In Figure 24
we report the age proles for the variance of logs of dierent variables when we ignore the
cohort eects and control for dierences in year eects. In panel (a) we plot the age prole
for labor earnings of the head. We nd that dispersion increases monotonically over the life
cycle, with the total increase around 30 percentage points. In panel (b) we plot dispersion
in household labor earnings and in household total disposable income. Dispersion in
household labor earnings behaves very similarly to dispersion in labor earnings of the
head, with a larger increase of around 40 percentage points that seems to happen in the
latter part of the life cycle. Dispersion in disposable income, however, is much lower and
grows less, around 20 percentage points. This suggests that nancial and public incomes
serve to smooth out both permanent and transitory components of dispersion in the labor
market.
In panel (c) we report again dispersion in household labor earnings and disposable
income, but for the variables equivalized by the OECD scale. Dispersion in equivalized
household labor earnings grows around 10 percentage points less than dispersion in raw
earnings. Dispersion in the equivalized measure of household disposable income remains
basically constant over the life cycle. The smaller growth of inequality in equivalized
household earnings is mainly due to the fact that, for young households, the level of
inequality of equivalized household earnings is larger than the level of inequality of raw
earnings. This may be partly explained by the negative correlation between female labor
supply and the number of children. The absence of growth of inequality in equivalized
household disposable income may be understood by noting that, for old households, the
level of inequality of equivalized disposable income is lower than its raw counterpart. This
may be related to the fact that at advanced ages there is a positive correlation between
37In 2002 this changed to 15, but individuals in our data set that are at the end of the life-cycle are
not aected by this reform.
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household size and the number of household members contributing to the household bud-
get: household members other than the main couple tend to be their retired parents who
receive a retirement pension.
Finally, in panel (d) we plot the evolution of inequality in consumption and equivalized
consumption. Dispersion in consumption grows little until age 42 and then it increases
markedly for an overall increase of around 17 percentage points. Instead, when we equiv-
alize consumption with the OECD scale, the growth of inequality is smaller, around 4
percentage points. Additionally, we consider an alternative denition of equivalized con-
sumption by regressing out the number of adults and children.38 We report this age prole
in panel (d) of Figure 24. This alternative measure of equivalized consumption increases
8 percentage points, with most of the increase happening in the second part of the life-
38OECD equivalences of scale are an arbitrary way to capture increasing returns in consumption at the
household level due to the fact that some consumption goods are public at the household level. Dierent
consumption bundles in dierent countries may be subject to the increasing returns at dierent rates.
Moreover, the standard OECD scale may be a good approximation for households of small size but it
may be bad for households of larger size. In our sample there is a lot of heterogeneity in household size,
with some households being comprised of several adults (in Spain, young adults live with their parents for
many years and when the young adults leave home it is the old grandparents who go in). For this reason
we consider an alternative way of controlling for household size in consumption. We regress our measure
of log raw consumption against linear and quadratic terms in the number of adults and the number of
kids. Then, we dene equivalized consumption as the residual of this regression.
44cycle.39 Therefore, regarding consumption we have dierent patterns depending on how
we control for household size: a growth of 17 percentage points for raw consumption,
a growth of 8 percentage points for consumption equivalized by our regression and a 4
percentage increase for consumption equivalized by the OECD scale.
How can we interpret these graphs in terms of the structure of income uncertainty?
All the denitions of labor earnings coincide in showing increasing dispersion over the
life-cycle. Following MaCurdy (1982) we can interpret this as evidence in favor of the
existence of persistent shocks to labor earnings. As discussed by Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron (2004), the properties of the stochastic process are revealed by the curvature
of the age prole: when it is concave it means less than unitary persistence, whereas when
it is linear it suggests the existence of a unit root. Our proles are convex. There are
two ways of rationalizing this. First, it can be that innovations are heteroskedastic, with
variance increasing after age 42 or so. Second, it can be that the persistence of shocks
is very weak until age 42 and it becomes stronger afterwards. This second interpretation
would be consistent with the view that long-term unemployment in Spain was specially
severe for older workers.40 Under the view that labor earnings shocks are important, the
proles of consumption reveal information on their insurability. We observe that inequal-
ity in consumption grows over the life-cycle, but it does so at a lower rate than inequality
in earnings. Following Deaton and Paxson (1994), we can interpret this as evidence of
imperfect insurance of the shocks: full insurance would imply that consumption inequal-
ity is constant through the life-cycle and absolute lack of insurance would imply that
consumption inequality tracks perfectly inequality in labor earnings. There is however an
alternative interpretation for the increasing variance of labor earnings. Lillard and Willis
(1979) rst suggested that the increase of earnings inequality over the life cycle may be
due to permanent dierences in the rate of growth of earnings. Of course, if these dier-
ences are perfectly known to individuals and there are no strong credit constraints, then
consumption inequality should not change with age. However, Guvenen (2007) argues
that people may not know their own rate of growth of earnings. Then, if people learn
about it as income realizations unfold, the age-proles of consumption will be increasing
and convex.
39For comparison, we also dene a second measure of equivalized household disposable income by
taking the equivalence of scale obtained through regression in consumption and applying it to household
disposable income. We report inequality of this second equivalized measure of household disposable
income in panel (c) of Figure 24.
40A possible third explanation would be sample selection. Among young workers, only those who
receive good shocks leave their parents home and become household heads, whereas those who receive
bad shocks stay with their parents and do not enter a sample of heads. However, if this argument was
true, one would expect the increase in variance to start around age 30 or so, when most males are already
household heads independently of their labor market history. In addition, the convex prole also arises
in samples of individuals, like sample 3 in the ECHP (not reported here).
457 Conclusions
In this article we explore the evolution of inequality in Spain along several dimensions for
the period 1985-2000. The clearer nding is that inequality in individual labor earnings in
Spain has decreased substantially, with the decrease in the college premium being the main
observable factor behind this fall. In addition, the substantial decrease in unemployment
from around 24 percentage in 1985 to 13 percentage in 2000 drives a hefty increase in the
incomes at the lower tail of the distribution. Part of the fall in the tertiary education
premium is due to this reduction in unemployment, which aected dierently dierent
education groups. Inequality in household disposable income has followed the same trend,
but with a smaller drop and milder uctuations. Two things are worth mentioning with
respect to household disposable income. First we nd that all along the period public
transfers play a crucial role in smoothing out the inequality arising in the labor market.
Second the Spanish family does not seem to have been an important insurance mechanism.
Inequality of labor earnings at the household level is larger than at the individual level, and
private transfers between households have a very minor impact in inequality reduction.
Finally, concerning household consumption, inequality has fallen less than inequality in
household disposable income, with the decrease mostly concentrated in the second half of
the eighties, when, according to our estimates, the decrease in income inequality seems
to be driven by permanent sources.
Focusing on the dierent stages of the business cycle, we nd that the economic
expansions between 1985 and 1992 and then the one that ranges from the mid 90's to
the end of our sample period in the year 2000, brought a clear reduction of inequality
between households. Inequality in labor earnings of workers fell and so did inequality in
disposable income at the household level, albeit to a lesser degree. The fall in inequality
in labor market earnings can be related to two observable changes: the decrease in the
incidence of unemployment and the fall in the college premium, with the dierence in the
average annual earnings of workers with a college degree and the rest of workers shrank 40
percentage points during the period. The simultaneous increase in the experience premium
attenuated the eect on inequality. Then, the recession of 1992 and 1993 witnessed
increases in inequality for all variables, mainly as a result of the increase in unemployment.
Finally, when we look at the evolution of inequality over the life cycle we nd increases
in inequality of individual wages and household earnings, stronger after the mid 40's,
and also a much smaller increase in inequality of household disposable income. Raw
consumption inequality increases quite dramatically from age 40, however, equivalized
consumption shows a much atter pattern. We provide two alternative interpretations
for the increase in earnings and consumption dispersion over the life cycle. First, that
persistent shocks to earnings become either more volatile or more persistent during the
second half of the life-cycle. Second, the existence of pre-determined dierences in the rate
of growth of earnings together with borrowing constraints, or alternatively the assumption
that workers do not know their own type and learn about it as new income shocks unfold.
Finally, heterogeneity in household size at the end of the life-cycle seems to play an
important role in explaining the increase in raw consumption inequality.
46After collecting all these facts, several questions remain open. First, the fall in the
tertiary education premium is at odds with the experience in other countries. Does this
mean that no skill-biased technical change took place in Spain? The increase in the
experience premium at a time in which the age composition of the labor force did not
change too much suggests the existence of some skill-biased demand shift happening in
Spain. The simultaneous increase in the supply of college workers may have compensated
this demand shift and hence the returns to college education have fallen. However, it
would be interesting to explore this issue in more detail and learn about the size of the
demand shift for skilled workers and check whether other explanations may also be valid.
For instance, despite the fact that the age composition of the labor force has not changed
much, the massive entrance of female workers suggest a fall of more accurate measure of
experience because females work fewer hours. With a fall in the supply of experience is
not clear that we can interpret the increase in the experience premium as coming from
an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers. Second, the larger inequality in
household labor earnings than in individual labor earnings suggests that the Spanish
family is not a good insurance mechanism against labor market uncertainty. Why is so?
Is this just because of assortative mating and higher participation rates of more educated
women? Or are labor earnings shocks correlated among spouses? Finding out about
this is a key ingredient to understand how uncertainty in the labor market aects welfare.
Third, the fall in inequality coming from the labor market in the second half of the nineties
was completely oset by the increase in inequality in nancial income. This happened at
a time in which the portfolio of Spanish households shifted from bank deposits to equity
in rms. It would be interesting to explore the determinants of these changes and its
asymmetric impact in household nancial income. Finally, we have estimated the relative
size of transitory shocks and permanent shocks. The fall in the variance of permanent
shocks in the second half of the 80's is consistent with the observed fall in the variance of
consumption during the same period. However, the fall in consumption inequality seems
far too small compared to the fall in the variance of permanent shocks. Further research
is needed to reconcile these ndings. One possibility is that income data alone is not good
enough to separate permanent from transitory innovations, and hence one would like to
add information of consumption as Blundell and Preston (1998). A second possibility is
that transitory shocks are not fully insurable by Spanish households. However, preliminary
results by Casado (2009) suggests that this is not the case. Finally, given the quarterly
frequency of the ECPF, it may be interesting to see whether the modeling of transitory
shocks may require a larger lag structure, which could change both the decomposition
between permanent and transitory shocks and the degree of insurability of transitory
shocks found by Casado (2009).
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50A Appendix: variable denitions
A.1 The ECPF
In the ECPF all income variables come net of taxes and social security payments. Income
variables at the household level are the sum of the corresponding category for all household
members.
 Labor earnings: earnings from dependent work plus two thirds of earnings from
personally-owned business
 Labor earnings plus private transfers: we add private transfers to the previous series
 Labor earnings plus private and public transfers: we add public transfers such as
unemployment benets and retirement and disability pensions to the previous series
 Total disposable income: total non-nancial income plus capital income, which
includes one third of the earnings coming from personally-owned business
 Consumption: we use expenditure in non-durable consumption goods and services.
In particular, there are more than 300 dierent items that can be grouped in nine
categories:
1. Food, beverages and tobacco
2. Clothing and shoes
3. House utilities, such as heating, electricity and water
4. Goods and services for the house, such as cleaning products
5. Medical expenditures
6. Transport
7. Entertainment and culture
8. Other goods and services, such as hotels and restaurants
9. Other expenditures
A.2 The ECHP
Here we provide details of the ECHP variables used to build the income variables.
Individuals sample:
 Labor earnings: total net monthly wage and salary earnings in current year (pi21m).
 Hours worked: total number of hours worked per week in main an additional jobs
(pe005).
51 Wage: total net monthly wage and salary earnings divided by weekly hours multi-
plied by 4.3 (pi21m divided by pe005 times 4.3).
Heads and household samples:
 Head wage: head's total net monthly wage and salary earnings divided by head's
weekly hours multiplied by 4.3 (pi21m divided by pe005 times 4.3).
 Head labor earnings: head's total net income from work (wage and salary earnings
plus self-employment income) in year prior to the survey (pi110).
 Household labor earnings: household's total net income from work (wage and salary
earnings plus self-employment income) in year prior to the survey (hi110).
 Household labor earnings plus private transfers: we add private transfers (hi123) to
household's labor earnings.
 Household labor earnings plus private and public transfers: we add public transfers
(hi130: unemployment benets, disability, retirement pensions and other public
transfers) to household's labor earnings plus private transfers.
 Household disposable income: we add net capital income (hi121) to household dis-
posable income minus nancial income.
Education in the ECHP is the highest level of general or higher education completed
(pt022). There are 3 categories for this variable that use the The International Standard
Classication of Education (ISCED) designed by UNESCO: 1: those with education level
of ISCED 5-7, 2: those with education level of ISCED 3 and, nally, 3: those with
education level ISCED 0-2.
So rst level closely corresponds to the college graduate in the US categorization,
although those with ISCED 5 are not college graduated. The second level corresponds to
the high school graduates in the US categorization and the third level to dropouts.
B Appendix: Complementary Statistics
B.1 Denition of household head
Throughout our analysis, in households with more than one adult we have dened the
head as the adult with the highest regular income. This is a slightly dierent denition
from the more common one, which takes as the head the oldest male in the household.
Our denition allows us to use the education information for the whole period of study
and we argue that it does not have strong implications regarding the pattern of inequality.
To see this, in panel (a) of Figure 25 we show that both the level and trend in the variance
of log earnings of the household head are similar with the two alternative denitions of
the head. In panel (b) of Figure 25 we observe that the same is true for the Gini index.
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B.2 Dierent income denitions in the ECHP
The main income measures in the ECHP refer to the whole year before the interview
takes place and are net of taxes. However, the ECHP also reports labor earnings in the
month previous to the interview and for this measure there is a version before taxes as
well as a version after taxes. We have used the annual income measures for samples 1 and
2 (which are after taxes) and the after tax monthly measure to compute wages in sample
3. In this section we want to compare (a) the after tax and before tax versions of the
monthly earnings variable, and (b) the monthly and annual earnings variables.
The data before taxes contains a large amount of missing observations, which is one
of the reasons why we have excluded them from the main analysis (the other reason
being to preserve comparability between data sets). In panel (b) of Figure 26 we plot
the variance of logs for both before tax and after tax monthly household earnings. As
expected, inequality in the after tax series is substantially smaller. However, the two
series co-move perfectly, indicating that changes in the tax code during the period had a
negligible eect in labor earnings inequality.
In panel (a) of Figure 26 we plot the variance of logs of annual earnings after taxes
and monthly earnings after taxes. As shown, inequality of annual earnings is much higher
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than inequality of monthly earnings, although the gap closes along time. There are
several reasons for this. First, the variable for monthly earnings does not include earnings
from self-employment. As self-employment income shows a much higher inequality than
income for employees this dierence should create more inequality for the series of annual
earnings. Second, unemployment spells shorter than a year and longer than a month
reduce annual earnings but not monthly earnings. This creates more inequality in the
variable of annual earnings. Consistently, the inequality dierence between the two series
narrows in the years in which unemployment falls and widens in the years in which
unemployment increases.
B.3 Life cycle controlling for cohort eects
In Figure 27 we report the age proles for the variance of logs of dierent variables when
we ignore the year eects and control for dierences in cohort eects. The overall picture
is very similar to the proles that control for year eects. In panel (a) we see that the
growth in inequality of labor earnings of the head is slightly smaller than when controlling
for year eects, around 17 percentage points. However, inequality at age 25 is the same.
In panel (b) we see that inequality in labor earnings at the household level increases
more than inequality in labor earnings for the heads. The size of the increase is around
34 percentage points. Inequality in total disposable income grows around 14 percentage
points, but the increase does not really start until age 42 or 43. Panel (c) shows that
inequality in the equivalized denition of household earnings is again very similar to the
raw counterpart. Regarding equivalized household disposable income e observe that the
variable equivalized with the OECD scale remains more or less constant over the life-cycle,
whereas the variable equivalized with the scale derived from the regression in consumption
grows 8 percent. Finally, panel (d) shows that inequality in consumption grows around
7 percentage points for the raw series and 4 percentage points for the series equivalized
through regression. However, the dispersion of the series equivalized with the OECD
equivalence scale remains constant over the life-cycle.
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